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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to address the implications of Basel III regulation on
counterparty credit risk. We analysed the development of OTC market, we
addressed systemic risk and the way how central counterparties could mitigate
or spread the contagion among banks. We used simulated data to develop a
stress test model to find out the impact of counterparty credit risk on banks’
capital requirements, in case the interest rate increased extensively. Six pos-
sible scenarios of interest rate levels were developed with ascending order of
the IR level. From these scenarios we computed the exposure levels and credit
valuation adjustment (CVA) as the market value of counterparty credit risk.
We came to the following conclusions: (1) Czech banks have enough capital to
withstand any interest rate increase in any scenario. (2) Banks with high expo-
sure to derivatives like Bank of America, Citibank and JP Morgan would face
severe problems if the interest rate increased. (3) There is no direct correlation
between credit valuation adjustment and interest rate, the CVA increases faster
with the increase of the interest rate.
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Abstrakt
Ćılem této práce je prozkoumat d̊usledky regulace Basel III na kreditńı riziko
protistrany. Analyzovali jsme vývoj OTC trhu, rozebrali systémové riziko a
zp̊usob, jak centrálńı protistrany mohou zmı́rnit nebo rozš́ı̌rit nákazu mezi
bankami. Použili jsme nasimulovaná data, abychom vytvořili stress test model
ke zjǐstěńı dopad̊u kreditńıho rizika protistrany na kapitálové požadavky bank,
když výrazně vzroste úroková mı́ra. Bylo vytvořeno šest možných scénář̊u
vývoje úrokové mı́ry se vzr̊ustaj́ıćı hodnotou. Z těchto scénář̊u jsme spoč́ıtali
úroveň expozice a credit valuation adjustment (CVA) jako tržńı hodnotu kre-
ditńıho rizika protistrany. Došli jsme k následuj́ıćım závěr̊um: (1) České banky
maj́ı dostatečný kapitál k tomu, aby odolaly jakémukoli vzr̊ustu úrokové mı́ry
v kterémkoli scénáři. (2) Banky s vysokou derivátovou expozićı jako Bank of
Amerika, Citibank a JP Morgan by čelily výrazným problémům, pokud by se
úroková mı́ra zvýšila. (3) Mezi CVA a úrokovou mı́rou neńı př́ımá úměra, CVA
roste rychleji s r̊ustem úrokové mı́ry.
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For valuation of counterparty credit risk I shall first use modelling credit exposure utilizing scenario generation 
and instrument valuation. For the modelling part I will use Monte Carlo simlulation in Stata or EViews. Then I 
will use credit value adjustment (CVA) formula for calculating market value of counterparty credit risk.  
Since my research will mostly incorporate the issues of banking sector, the most challenging part of my work 
will be the acquisition of data. I will try to utilize data from BIS statistics website and perhaps the database of 
CSOB, which am currently working for. 
1. Counterparty risk is correctly estimated under Basel III 
2. There is a negative relationship between risk exposure and counterparty credit quality  
3. Central counterparty (CCP) mitigates counterparty risk 
4. Hedging the counterparty risk with credit derivatives becomes more difficult for corporations under 
Basel III  
The counterparty credit risk proved to be one of the leading sources of losses during the recent financial crisis 
and thus it is of great importance to deal with it successfully. The shortcoming of Basel I and II was the 
estimation of counterparty risk, which was based on a computation technique called Value at Risk. The 
estimation allowed banks to use lower capital charge and also it assessed various assets to be more liquid, 
hence less risky. This assessment was wrong and so we witnessed for instance the fall of Lehman Brothers. 
In my thesis I will try to address this challenging problem and investigate the implications that the new 
regulation rules of Basel III will have on counterparty risk. 
The original contribution of this thesis will be the up-to-date revaluation of Basel III with its approach to  
mitigation and hedging counterparty credit risk and the role of central counterparties as helpful institutions in 
this matter.  
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The regulation of the banking sector is changing once more. Since the beginning
of the recent crisis the regulators were focussing on finding the cause of this
financial distress. It became obvious that one of the leading causes of the crisis
was a weak base of bank capital. That is why stricter rules of Basel III were
introduced to ensure that in the future the banks will have a strong capital base
to build on. Beside increasing the quality and quantity of regulatory capital,
it addresses systemic risk within the global financial system and introduces
tools and standards at macroprudential level. But a question rises: Will these
measures not just hopefully stop a next crisis to happen but in the same time
significantly slow the recovery from the current one?
The OTC market was in the past decade growing rapidly and thus it is im-
portant to analyse how Basel III handles counterparty credit risk (CCR). This
is a risk of a counterparty going bankrupt, where the exposure of the contract
is not known in the future. This happens particularly within the OTC trans-
actions. CCR is supposed to be reduced or eliminated by institutions called
central counterparties. These institutions serve as intermediaries in the trade
and take on the entire risk for a price. The question is: Does these central coun-
terparties reduce also systemic risk? What would be the consequences if some
of these institutions went bankrupt? They are so called SIFIs, systemically
important financial institutions and they are too big and too interconnected
to fail. Hence the moral hazard of the management should be anticipated and
reduced by careful regulations.
The objective of this thesis is to find answers on the questions above with a
strong focus on counterparty credit risk, its origin, consequences, management
and impact on banks. Three main hypotheses are tested in the thesis. First,
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Czech banks have enough capital to satisfy capital requirements for CCR in
case of the increase of interest rate. Second, there are banks in the USA with
high exposure to derivatives that would face severe problems in case of interest
rate increase. Third, there is a direct correlation between credit valuation
adjustment and interest rate.
The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 describes the theoretical
background that is divided into several sections devoted to the following topics:
First we talk about OTC market, its development, where is it heading and how
is it going to be influenced by regulations Emir and Dodd-Frank Act. Second
section analyses the systemic risk and central counterparties are discussed in
the third section. In section four we talk about Basel III and its predecessors,
how the rules have changed and the particular measures that are taken to fight
the crisis. In the last section of the theoretical background there is a theoretical
analysis of stress tests. Chapter three contains the actual model. We specify
the parameters, set the ground for the computation, compute the exposure of a
swap and get to the credit valuation adjustments. We summarize the findings




In this section we will discuss the OTC derivatives market. We shall start
with the distinction of this particular market based on Kalinowski (2011) and
Valiante (2010) then we will devote to its development with respect to exist-
ing semiannual data from BIS Statistics (2012). After that we will focus on
the regulation of the OTC derivatives market according to Kalinowski (2011)
and Mello & Parsons (2012). After that we summarize the EMIR and Dodd-
Frank Act as the most important OTC regulations and finally provide possible
scenarios of its future evolvement based on Valiante (2010) and Dudley (2012).
2.1.1 Development of OTC Market
The OTC derivatives market is the largest market for derivatives. According
to Kalinowski (2011), one of the biggest distinction between OTC market and
trading on an exchange is the amount of regulation. OTC market is from a large
part unregulated with respect to disclosure of information between the trading
parties. Less strict criteria for trading impose higher risk on the investors and
particularly on speculators that do not use derivatives to protect their core
business but rather use them for high-risk speculative investments.
Valiante (2010) adds two more reasons for trading derivatives apart from
hedging and speculation. They are funding and arbitrage. Derivatives can be
a tool to redistribute funds between financial or non-financial institutions to
provide best way to satisfy financial needs and to redistribute risks in a certain
way. The last but not least usage of derivatives as a tool for arbitrage facilitates
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the mechanism of price formation, for instance CDS spreads are widely used as
a tool for risk management that can price credit risk of a specific counterparty.
Figure 2.1: OTC derivatives market trends
Source: Author based on BIS Statistics (2012)
Analysing the volume of OTC market using data from BIS Statistics (2012)
we found that global OTC derivatives market rose steadily from 127.5 trillion
dollars in 2002 to 672 trillion dollars in 2008. The trend can be seen in Fig-
ure 2.1. We can see two peaks. The crisis caused the volumes to drop by 13%
(2007 to 2009). After the mild growth till 2010 the derivatives market soared
again by 15% in June 2011 only to drop by 9% at the end of 2011.
Figure 2.2: CDS - Gross notional amounts outstanding, in billions of
USD
Source: Author based on BIS Statistics (2012)
The composition of OTC market changed during the examined period. Two
most distinct examples are credit default swaps (CDS) and interest rate deriva-
tives. The former can be seen in Figure 2.2, the latter in Figure 2.3. The CDS
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rose from 2% in 2004 to 10% in 2008. During and after the crisis the percentage
steadily decreased again to 4.4%.
Figure 2.3: Interest rate derivatives - Gross notional amounts out-
standing, in billions of USD
Source: Author based on BIS Statistics (2012)
The interest rate derivatives comprise by far the major part of OTC market
volume. However it became less popular in pre-crisis period and dropped from
74.8% in 2004 to 67.1% in 2007. During the crisis the rise was substantional
and ended up at 77.8% in the end of 2011.
2.1.2 OTC Market Regulation
The financial crisis showed weak points in derivatives markets such as the occur-
rence of systemic risk. Hence Kalinowski (2011) suggests that a new regulation
is needed to manage these weaknesses. After the wave of the crisis there were
indeed attempts to introduce surveillance of the OTC market to prevent the
situation that came in 2007-2009. Clearing houses were established in the U.S.
and in Europe regulations came to force which referred to accountability and
reporting of derivative transactions between banks.
One of the possible regulative steps is to ban every derivative transaction
from the OTC market to a regulated market, where every transaction is prop-
erly recorded. However, there are two purposes the OTC derivatives market is
used for. While banks take speculative positions and want to increase profits,
non-financial companies just want to hedge their income against currency fluc-
tuation, fuel price fluctuation and other. Thus the incentives are to introduce
the obligation to contain derivative transactions on a regulated market with the
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exception for non-financial firms, which can continue to use OTC derivatives
market (Kalinowski 2011).
But does greater use of clearing and hence margining increase costs of hedg-
ing for non-financial firms? Mello & Parsons (2012) discuss this question and
give the answer, that the cost of hedging is not being increased. They claim,
margining does not change the total financing or capital that the non-financial
corporation requires to back its hedging. Since a non-margined derivative is
equivalent to a package of a margined derivative and a contingent line of credit,
a margin mandate merely requires that this package be marketed as two distinct
products.
2.1.3 EMIR & Dodd-Frank Act
Regulation of EMIR in the EU and Dodd-Frank Act in the US will significantly
change the rules for dealing with OTC derivatives. According to Muehlen-
brock (2012), the rules will imply, that all standardized OTC derivatives con-
tracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic trading platform and cleared
through central counterparties. Moreover, the contracts should be reported to
trade repositories.
The impact of the regulation is expected to be significant to all parties
involved in OTC derivative transactions. The common objective of the new
regulations of EMIR and Dodd-Frank Act is to mitigate systemic risk and
increase transparency in the OTC derivatives market. However, there are dis-
tinct differences between the two regulations. Concerning the timeline of the
two regulations Dodd-Frank Act came to force already in July 2010, whereas
the final text of EMIR was agreed upon in February 2012. The scope of EMIR
consists of wide range of OTC derivatives covering different segments of the
OTC derivatives market, but is unclear about foreign exchange derivatives.
Out of scope of Dodd-Frank Act are spot and forward FX swaps. Considering
which transaction should and should not be cleared, EMIR delegates the au-
thority to European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which has the
criteria for systemic risk reduction, liquidity of contracts and other. For non-
cleared trades there is likely to be introduced higher capital charge and higher
rate for exposures toward central counterparties (CCPs). For Dod-Frank Act
similar rules are also valid, with the exception of the authority which in this
case is Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Since the two regulations,
the Dodd-Frank Act and EMIR were developed independently, they do not cor-
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respond exactly well. One issue may fall into both regulations and is treated
differently. There are, however, intentions to harmonize these issues, for ex-
ample by the OTC Derivatives Regulators’ forum, but the practical problems
remain still unresolved (Muehlenbrock 2012).
Apart from the regulation stated above, G20 agreed to add margin re-
quirements on non-centrally-cleared derivatives with help of Basel Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and International Organization of Securi-
ties Commissions (IOSCO). The introduction of margin requirements for non-
centrally-cleared derivatives have two benefits: Reduction of systemic risk and
promotion of central clearing. As not all derivatives are suitable for central
clearing, be it e.g. for its complexity, margin requirements would be expected
to reduce contagion and spillover effects and help to decrease system’s vul-
nerability to procyclicality of uncollateralised exposure. Moreover, because
central clearing is costly partially because of the margin that has to be posted
by the CCP, introducing margin requirements for non-centrally-cleared deriva-
tives would promote central clearing and hence in turn reduce systemic risk.
Importantly, this measure has to be internationally consistent, because other-
wise could the trading activity move to regions with lower margin requirements,
making the effectiveness of the margin requirement less effective and simulta-
neously giving competitive advantage to the low-margin locations (BCBS and
IOSCO 2012).
The key principles are according to BCBS and IOSCO (2012) following:
 All derivative transactions have to respect the appropriate margining
practices.
 The initial and variation margin have to be exchanged by all financial
firms and systemically-important non-financial entities.
 The institution have to ensure that the collateral is liquid so it can be
in reasonable time period and can serve to cover the losses in case of
counterparty default.
 The margin should be immediately available to the collecting party and
be subject to arrangements that fully protects the posting party.
 The regulatory regimes should interact and be sufficiently consistent.
According to Miller & Ruane (2012), the Dodd-Frank Act provide excep-
tions to the clearing requirement for swaps when one of the counterparty is not
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a financial entity. This is an important point for commercial firms, because
they often use OTC derivatives to mitigate its own commercial risk. However
it is not enough to be a non-financial firm to become the exception. The swaps
must be used for the purpose of hedging or mitigating commercial risk. It must
not be used for speculation, investing or trading, and for mitigating the risk of
another swap or security-based swap position, unless the position itself is used
to mitigate commercial risk.
Concerning the operational implications of EMIR and the Dodd-Frank Act,
they will impact both processes as well the parties involved in OTC transac-
tions. Moreover, it affects the infrastructure in general (CCP and trade reposi-
tories). The regulations will implement new legal documentation requirements
as well as change of IT systems of the institution. There will be different
collateral management setup and margin calculation. A duplication of pro-
cesses due to bifurcation of collateral will increase the complexity of proce-
dures. The funding of collaterals will also change the collateral management.
Moreover, if the derivative transactions are not being cleared through central
counterparty, EMIR requires the implementation of sound risk management
techniques, which implies the appropriate level of capital and an internal eval-
uation of derivatives (Muehlenbrock 2012).
The Aims of the EMIR and Dodd-Frank Act are as follows.
 Enhanced transparency - reporting all transaction details to the trade
repository. The data will be available to regulators and the informations
will be centrally stored. Having access to the informations, the regulators
will be more equipped to spot any potential problems in advance. More-
over, market participants will have better overview of central derivative
transactions, because trade repositories will publish aggregate positions
by class of derivatives.
 Mitigation of counterparty credit risk - introduction of a mandatory clear-
ing of the identified OTC derivatives through CCPs. The CCPs will
require highly liquid collaterals, stemming from daily margin calls (e.g.
initial and variation margin). However, the counterparty credit risk miti-
gated in this way is likely to transform into concentration risk (collateral
will be held only in few places) and higher liquidity risk for the CCPs.
This issue takes EMIR into consideration and presents prudential require-
ments and prudential measures to deal with it.
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 Mitigation of operational risk - use of electronic means ensuring accurate
execution, timely confirmation as well as proper reconciliation.
2.1.4 Prospects for the OTC Derivatives Market
Valiante (2010) introduces four different scenarios of potential development in
the derivatives market.
 Pure OTC derivatives
 Centrally-cleared OTC derivatives
 Disclosed and highly collateralised bilateral transactions
 Exchange-traded derivatives
They are displayed in the Figure 2.4 with respect to regulation, clearing
and other features.
Figure 2.4: OTC derivatives matrix
Source: Author based on Valiante (2010)
Scenario A is according to Valiante (2010) a current scenario, where no
regulatory intervention takes place. OTC derivatives are mainly traded on bi-
lateral basis and transaction are highly customized. Disclosure is mainly self-
regulated. In Scenario B derivative transaction are cleared on central basis by
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central counterparties (CCP). These are discussed in a separate chapter. Sce-
nario C attempts to find a compromise between customization and disclosure.
Finally, Scenario D deals only with mandatory regulation of derivatives trades
with centralized trading and clearing. This scenario would be efficient for flexi-
ble, large scale and highly volatile products. Therefore this scenario should not
be mandatory and should be limited only to certain kinds of products (Valiante
2010).
In his speech, president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Dudley (2012) gave more shape to the OTC derivatives market development.
He addressed the shortcomings of the market, mainly high opacity and liquidity
shortage. He created five elements necessary to reform the OTC derivatives
market. They are:
 Create strong incentives in the system to provide an impulse for dealers
to standardize OTC derivatives trades whenever practical.
 All standardized OTC derivative trades should be mandatorily cleared
through CCPs.
 Records for all OTC derivative trades must be reported to trade reposi-
tories.
 Two standard-setting bodies — the Committee on Payment and Settle-
ment Systems (CPSS) and the Technical Committee of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) — would strengthen
and broaden the principles for financial market infrastructures.
 The Principles would be adopted globally.
These measures would reduce the opaqueness of the OTC derivatives mar-
ket, improve transparency and price discovery. Furthermore central clearing
would reduce the aggregate amount of risk in the system.1 (Dudley 2012).
2.2 Systemic Risk
This section is devoted to systemic risk, its definition based on Co-Pierre (2011)
and Bandt et al. (2011), followed by types of systemic risk where mainly the
1For more discussion see sections Systemic Risk and Central Counterparty.
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ideas of Co-Pierre (2011), Gai & Kapadia (2010) and Acharya (2009) are intro-
duced. This is followed by a discussion about Systemically Important Financial
Institutions and finally a discussion about policies based on Laeven & Valencia
(2008).
2.2.1 Introduction to Systemic Risk
Systemic risk is a broadly defined term and the meaning of it has considerably
changed in the last few years. Before crisis systemic risk was mostly perceived
as probability of contagion effects that cause cascades of defaults. During the
crisis, however, it was discovered that systemic risk can occur from two other
sources: (i) a common shock which leads to a simultaneous default of several
financial institutions at once and (ii) informational spillovers, bad news about
one bank can increase the costs of refinancing for all other banks (Co-Pierre
2011).
According to Bandt et al. (2011), there are two categories of systemic risk,
broad and narrow. In the narrow sense the systemic risk is understood as
contagion effects on interbank markets and in broad sense it is perceived as a
common shock to many institutions or markets. The cause of the event could be
either a shock from outside the financial system or within it. If the concerned
intermediaries fail or concerned markets are dysfunctional then the systemic
risk will become great. Because all these dimension are in interaction with
each other, that makes systemic risk a very complex phenomenon (Co-Pierre
2011).
2.2.2 Types of Systemic Risk
Contagion of systemic risk appears due to direct linkages between financial
institutions mostly in the interbank market. In this setting banks or other
financial institutions like hedge funds or insurance companies can be seen as
nodes in the net and the connections as edges. This interconnectedness have
two major implications. First, it can lead to risk sharing and better liquidity
allocation amongst the banks. Second, with regard to systemic risk, it can
amplify the contagion effects (Co-Pierre 2011).
This point of view is supported also by Gai & Kapadia (2010). They claim
that in a highly connected system, losses of the failing institution can be much
more widely dispersed hence there is smaller risk of contagion. But on the other
hand, if a systemically important institution fails there is a higher probability
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of contagious defaults and potential for contagion to spread more widely. In
particular, an institution that survive the first wave of defaults is due to high
connectivity more vulnerable to a second-round default. Thus effects of any
crises can be extremely devastating.
Common shocks are another source of systemic risk. A common shock oc-
curs, when a number of banks hold identical or similar assets. This causes the
correlation between their portfolios, which might trigger a fire-sale that can
cause significant losses to a large number of banks (Co-Pierre 2011).
Acharya & Yorulmazer (2008) explains why banks can be motivated to
increase the correlation between their assets and hence the risk of common
shocks. The reason is to prevent costs which arise from potential information
spillovers. A bank’s last year returns are signals for depositors. If the returns of
one bank are low then higher deposit rates are required from depositors. This
is the motivation for increasing the correlation between investments, because
it increases the probability of joint success resulting in lower costs.
Acharya (2009) analyses another reason for increasing the asset correlation
of banks by avoiding negative externalities that arise from a bank failure. These
negative effects appear because depositors are not willing or able to lend their
money to a bank thus the surviving bank face higher refinancing costs. If this
negative externality is not compensated for lower monitoring and information
costs that also arise from a bank failure, then the bank will ex ante increase
the portfolio correlation to avoid these negative externalities.
Spillovers or informational contagion are according to Acharya & Yorulmazer
(2003) another form of systemic risk. The idea behind this is that the insolvent
bank can increase the refinancing costs of the surviving banks because of the
herding behaviour that usually take place during financial crises.
These different forms of risk are according to Co-Pierre (2011) not indepen-
dent of each other. They all contribute to stir up the financial crises as during
the coming default banks are fire-selling assets, then rumours spread around
the market causing tightening liquidity provision and this tightening can lead
to a default of the struggling bank. The default can trigger contagion effect
and hence spreading systemic crisis to the whole market.
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2.2.3 Systemically Important Financial Institutions
Common shocks and contagion effects can be triggered even by one defaulted
institution, which was proven by Lehman Brothers and AIG. These institu-
tions are called systemically important financial institutions (SIFI). A failure
of such institution may cause not only a financial market distress, but it might
negatively effect the economy as a whole. Therefore, macroprudential regula-
tive steps must be taken to impose additional requirements on the systemically
important institutions and hence lower the probability of default for these insti-
tutions. Such tools may be for example capital surcharges, contingent capital
or bail-in debt (Co-Pierre 2011).
BCBS (2011b) conducted in July 2011 a survey focussing on how much
loss absorbency potential global systemically important financial institutions
(G-SIFIs) need to reduce the probability of failure. To assess what financial
institution is considered a global systemically important financial institution
or global systemically important bank (G-SIB) an indicator based approach is
used. The selected indicators are the size of banks, their interconnectedness,
the lack of readily available substitutes for services that they provide, their
global (cross-jurisdictional) activity and complexity. Based on the outcome of
the indicator-based measurement the banks will be grouped into five buckets.
Additional loss absorbency for the highest populated bucket should be 2.5% of
risk-weighted assets. There is an initially empty top bucket of 3.5% of RWAs.
The rest is structured as follows:
Table 2.1: Bucketing approach
Bucket Score range Minimum additional loss
absorbency (as a per-
centage of RWAs)
5 (empty) D - 3.5%
4 C - D 2.5%
3 B - C 2.0%
2 A - B 1.5%
1 Cut-off point - A 1.0%
Source: Author based on BCBS (2011b)
Risk weighted assets is the sum of different asset classes weighted according
to risk they represent. For example a loan secured by a collateral have lower
risk then a loan without one, risk free assets have a risk weight of zero. RWAs
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are based on three types of risk: market risk, operational risk and credit risk.
The concepts of RWAs should force banks to have a sound relation between
capital and risky positions (Carlsson & Silén 2012).
G-SIFIs are also important from the deleveraging perspective. As Wehinger
(2012) indicates, deleveraging of the financial system that was highly leveraged
before the crisis should be viewed as necessary process leading to recovery.
However, it is having both supply and demand effects, where supply side is also
driven by the new regulatory requirements. The effects of the regulation which
is mostly welcomed by financial industry might have negative consequences
regarding SIFIs. The additional capital requirements as a part of the new
regulation might make sense in isolation, but wider negative effects might stem
from them. One particular shortcoming is that they do not take into account
operational capability, which in many cases was found incomplete, mostly in
some of the large, globally active banks. For instance there in no common
regulatory framework concerning probability of default.
This opinion is supported by Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson (2012). Accord-
ing to this paper, the capital and liquidity rules set by the new regulations
create bias against lending to the enterprise sector. Moreover, the paper shows
that movements in the balance sheet of G-SIFIs are dominated by derivatives
with varying exposure and netting does not provide the protection against
market risk. Another problem stems from collateral and margin calls that are
pro-cyclical, which amplifies the liquidity shortage in time of crisis.
Deleveraging may be executed according to Wehinger (2012) in three ways:
raising capital, reducing (risk-weighted) assets and restricting lending. As the
most preferable way the author perceives raising capital but because of the
current market environment the issuance possibilities for banks are limited.
Concerning asset reduction, US banks have already got rid of the assets of worse
quality in the beginning of the crisis, whereas European banks keep on holding
these risky assets (loans) until they are serviced. The third way of deleveraging
is restricting lending, which is most unpleasant, but hardly avoidable.
The question is also raised about bank financing. Unsecured bank bonds will
under the Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio not qualify as high quality liquid
assets and so Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson (2012) claim there will be increase
of collateralised instruments, specifically covered bonds. These collateralised
instruments should be preferred according to the authors because they include
recourse to the originator and this should encourage better asset quality than
for example asset backed securities. Covered bonds are also generally more
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liquid then asset backed securities. moreover, covered bonds will be rated as
high quality liquid assets. Wehinger (2012) on the other hand argues that apart
from the positives, covered bonds have also negative characteristics. They are
encumber assets, a single name paper and the amount that the counterparty can
hold is limited. Moreover, because they appear on the balance sheet, covered
bonds cannot help capital ratios by reduction of the size of the issuer’s balance
sheet.
Apart from G-SIFIs the regulators also identify domestic systemically im-
portant institutions (D-SIFI) and domestic systemically important bank (D-
SIB). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision found appropriate to ad-
dress the externalities posed by D-SIBs the same way as it addresses the ex-
ternalities posed by G-SIBs. The externalities are created from the fact that
the government cannot afford to let these institutions go bankrupt because
they are too interconnected and pose a systemic risk. Moreover, there may
emerge direct costs from the moral hazard which is borne by the taxpayers,
in particular there may be created competitive distortions and reduced market
discipline. All in all this behaviour is likely to increase a probability of distress
in the future (BCBS 2012).
The principles of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision focusses on
the higher loss absorbency of the D-SIBs. Apart from that higher degree of
supervision is also required for D-SIBs. The regulations will become part of the
Basel III regulatory consistency assessment programme. The banks identified
as D-SIBs by their national authorities have to comply with the regulatory
framework by the January 2016.
2.2.4 Policies
Laeven & Valencia (2008) presents a paper of all systemic banking crises from
1970-2007 and policy responses with appropriate timing and resolution to them.
The analysis shows that countries adopted many measures and management
strategies with especially frequent use of emergency liquidity support and blan-
ket guarantees to restore confidence. This particular measure was not always
met with success.
To successfully handle a systemic crisis, a policymaker must know the na-
ture and the trigger of the crisis. For instance, if unsustainable fiscal policies
are the trigger, fiscal tightening may be needed to settle the crisis. However,
in most cases this does not happen and the expansionary fiscal policy is used.
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If financial market pressures are the trigger, tight monetary policy could help
contain them. But if the crisis is caused by liquidity and solvency problems, the
central bank should provide liquidity support to the illiquid banks. Moreover, if
the liquidity crisis is accompanied with systemic bank runs, government should
also provide depositor protection to ensure restored depositor confidence. How-
ever these measures tend to be very costly and not necessarily speed up the
recovery.
A very important parameter of successful economic policy is timing, the
speed of the intervention. As soon as the crisis reach a sufficient level and large
part of the financial system is insolvent, bank losses should be recognized, the
size of the problem should be established and the appropriate steps should
be taken to ensure adequate capitalization of financial institutions. The cap-
ital provision should be selective according clear quantifiable rules (Laeven &
Valencia 2008).
2.3 Central Counterparty
In this section we discuss the central counterparties (CCPs). We begin with
discussing the role of a CCP in financial markets and the tools of CCPs in order
to mitigate and reallocate the counterparty credit risk presenting thoughts of
Murphy (2012), Pirrong (2011) and Zhu & Pykhtin (2007). We finish the
section analysing the advantages and risks of central clearing based on Pirrong
(2011) and Milne (2012).
2.3.1 Role of CCPs
Central counterparty (CCP) is a financial entity that is used for clearing deriva-
tives in the OTC market.
The way how two counterparties trade with each other in a traditional OTC
transaction is called a ’bilateral trade’. A simple bilateral trade between two
counterparties is depicted in Figure 2.5. There is no clearing party involved.
Both of the parties are at risk to failure of each other during the life of the
contract. In Figure 2.6 works a CCP as an intermediary of the trade. It bears
the counterparty credit risk of the transaction hence it must pay all what is
owed to the non-defaulting party (Pirrong 2011).
The picture of the trade is however very simplified. Usually more parties are
involved and more contracts are being cleared. On top of that some contracts
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Figure 2.5: A simple bilateral derivatives market
Source: Murphy (2012)
Figure 2.6: A simple central cleared derivatives market
Source: Murphy (2012)
are not subjects of clearing. They are either illiquid or too complicated. This
leads to a picture more precise as in Figure 2.7. The dashed lines represent
bilateral contracts.
Figure 2.7: A more accurate picture of central cleared market
Source: Murphy (2012)
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2.3.2 Tools of CCPs
CCP uses variety of mechanisms and tools to mitigate and reallocate coun-
terparty credit risk. According to Pirrong (2011), these are netting, collater-
alization, insurance, equity, and mutualization. We now take a look at each
separately.
Netting is one of the main tools of CCPs. Netting agreement is a legally
binding contract between two counterparties that, in the event of default, allows
the transactions to be aggregated between two counterparties. In other words,
transactions with negative value can be used to off-set the transactions with
positive value and only the net positive value represents credit exposure at the
time of default (Zhu & Pykhtin 2007).
Collateralization is another useful tool which is widely used. The exchange
of collateral is a common issue for a bilateral exchange as well but a problem
stems from its informality. Who, how much or when is to rise the collateral is a
question that is hard to answer for trades on the bilateral basis. CCP sets the
exact rules that answer these questions. There are two types of collateral the
CCP requires. At the beginning of each derivative trade the trading parties
have to post so called initial margin (IM). Because prices of contracts are
varying over time, this leads to other collateral requirement called variation
margin (VM).
Figure 2.8: Initial and variation margin
Source: Murphy (2012)
The initiation and variation margin can be seen in Figure 2.8. IM protects
the CCP against the change in value of a portfolio of derivatives in case one of
the counterparties defaults. VM reflects changes in value between trade date
and the date of a call (Murphy 2012).
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Insurance, equity and mutualization are used because they shift the default
risk away from the CCP to some other party. Insurance reallocates default
losses from derivatives counterparties to the insurer for a nominal fee. CCP
equity is essential to be in a first loss position after the resources from the
defaulted counterparty (margins, default fund) are exhausted. Mutualization
is another way how to shift the default risk. A CCP may have other member
firms that are contributing to the default fund and hence agree to absorb some
default losses (Pirrong 2011).
2.3.3 Benefits of Central Clearing
A concept of CCP should bring positive effects to financial markets. Pirrong
(2011) understands CCPs as organizations that are intended to reduce coun-
terparty credit risk or in other words they should increase the probability that
contractually promised payments will be made. CCP can also contribute to the
stability of the financial system. By a CCP defaulted positions could be more
efficiently replaced and through netting they could be reduced. It can also
reduce price volatility and the occurrence of extreme price movements in the
case of a defaulted large derivatives trading firm. Moreover, since the default
losses are allocated more efficiently, CCPs can mitigate or eliminate potential
cascading defaults.
According to Milne (2012), the key benefit of CCPs is not a reduction of
counterparty credit risk. That could have been also achieved on the bilateral
basis. But the key benefit is reduction of systemic risk. This is done by
coordinated management of open positions in case of a default of systemically
important financial institution and improved oversight of market participants.
However, these benefits are public goods and so some policy interventions are
needed to ensure suitable adoption of CCP clearing.
2.3.4 Risks of Central Clearing
According to Milne (2012), the private costs of central clearing are insignificant,
important are the social costs to consider. It is necessary to take into account
the inefficiency in price discovery, which is caused by collateral management of
CCP. A great concern is that the CCPs would become a cause of a systemic risk
instead of the cure. A CCP is by default an interconnected financial institution
with billions of exposure. If insolvency of illiquidity occurs than a CCP may
become the source of systemic risk.
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Pirrong (2011) comments on the systemic risk of CCPs too. It is clear
that CCPs will not totally eliminate the systemic risk, it will merely reallocate
it. The CCPs will be very important systemic nods in the financial system
and a failure of one would cause many troubles. There could be a closure
on markets where the products are cleared. Furthermore a failure of a CCP
stemming from a bankruptcy of one of its counterparties would result to spread
of financial contagion.
2.3.5 Current Assessments of International Capital Market
Association
In the latest issue of quarterly report, ICMA (2013) brings news about CCP and
its impact on the economy, mainly it focuses on the impact on growth. The
impact of the regulatory steps both fiscal and monetary is hard to estimate
because of the dependence on the qualitative factors as of to what extend they
help to restore confidence in the financial system. What the authorities are
considering as a potential threat is that the regulatory measures would not
just hopefully prevent the next crisis to happen but also they would prevent to
recover from the current one. Hence the next questions should be addressed:
1. What will be the impact of overall regulatory measures on growth?
2. Are the proposed measures consistent with one another?
3. Will the regulative measures reduce systemic risk or simply reallocate it
from one set of financial institutions to another?
4. In Europe, would closer financial integration in the Euro area affect the
integrity of the Single Market across the EU?
The first question depends on the outcome of two contradictory forces.
The force that promotes growth is the restoration of market confidence and
future lending increase due to recapitalisation of the banks. The force that
goes against growth is imposition of austerity as a result of budget cuts that
reduces domestic demand. Moreover the increase of costs for the banks mainly
due to higher capital charges and increased margin requirements would also
push to impede growth. The steps should be taken to encourage capital market
financing that in Europe still represents a much smaller proportion of total
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financing than in the US. If not, at least they should not be taken to discourage
it.
The second question is quite an issue in the EU, because new regulatory
initiatives are sometimes introduced without proper consideration of the impact
of one measure on another. Also consistency between the EU, the US and
other countries is important to keep functional. Some countries do not think of
adoption important measures because the crisis did not originate with them.
The third question simply considers the fact that if the clearing shifts from
bilateral OTC counterparties to multilateral clearing houses, those institutions
may become too big and too interconnected to fail, hence there is a threat of
concentration of risk in those clearing houses.
The fourth question closely relates to the fact that a lot of euro business
is currently conducted outside euro area, especially in London. The point is
that to move the business to euro area would increase euro-area liquidity and
enhance oversight of euro in euro area. But it is not clear whether the amount
of euro business conducted in London prevented in any way the response of
euro-area authorities.
2.4 Regulation and Basel
In this section we will discuss the Basel III and its predecessors. First we
will acknowledge the shortcomings of Basel I and II based on King & Tarbert
(2011) and Byres (2012). Then the focus will be on Basel III and how it deals
with counterparty credit risk using articles from Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, Committee on the Global Financial System and Cecchetti (2012).
After that we discuss the capital requirements and counterparty credit risk,
what is different in Basel III, what are capital buffers and how they influence
the bank’s regulatory capital. Then we describe the leverage ratio introduced
by Basel III. As a last point we will talk about timeline of Basel III.
2.4.1 Shortcomings of Basel I,II
Basel I or Basel Capital Accord was established in 1988 as a response to pre-
vious perceived deregulation failures. As the banks wanted larger portion of
the market, they were increasing domestic and foreign exposures which were
not matched by increasing capital base. To fight the erosion of capital, Basel
I was founded as a international standard to introduce a regulatory measures
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concerning standardized regulatory ratio, defining regulatory capital (Tier 1
and Tier 2) and a uniform process by which banks calculate their regulatory
capital ratios. Moreover, to account for different risk levels the concept of
Risk-weighting assets was incorporated into Basel I. Particularly, sovereign
debt exposures were weighted at zero percent, residential mortgage loans at
50 percent, and unsecured commercial loans at 100 percent (King & Tarbert
2011).
According to King & Tarbert (2011), the achievement of uniform risk-weight
categories came up as one of the the framework’s greatest flaws. For example,
countries such as Greece and Ireland received same zero percent risk weighting
for national debt as the United States. The credit standing of corporate debt
was also neglected in the computations. Hence banks found out they could
seek higher yields at greater risks without increasing its capital base.
Byres (2012) has the same opinion, saying that if risk is mispriced in the reg-
ulatory framework, banks will participate in the activities where the restricted
capital would yield highest return, in other words, where risk is underpriced.
Basel I attempted to price risk within the regulatory framework but for the
last twenty years, various derivatives and complex financial products were too
sophisticated to Basel I to keep up with. ”We were allowing modern planes to
fly, but utilising outdated safety manuals” (Byres 2012, pg. 3).
Basel II was the revised version of Basel I, mostly in the area of redefining
RWAs. The previous calculations were based only on market risk and were
conceived too narrow, hence two more components were added: Market risk
and operational risk. However, the recent crisis showed that the weaknesses
were not completely removed. The definition of Tier 1 capital was left largely
intact thus banks could easily took advantage of it by lowering costs of their
capital. This lead to an erosion in capital levels leaving banks ill-equipped to
absorb significant losses. These insufficient buffers were most crucial in case of
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) (King & Tarbert 2011).
Byres (2012) adds that since Basel II was introduced after the crisis has
been seeded, we cannot find out if the better regulatory system would improve
the situation. Moreover the crisis revealed failings in all aspects of the financial
system, hence it is unlikely that better capital adequacy regime would avert
the crisis altogether.
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2.4.2 Basel 2.5
In July 2009 the enhanced capital rules were introduced by the Basel Com-
mittee and is now referred to as Basel 2.5 (BCBS 2009). It mainly focused
on the area of securitisation, more specifically for dealing with resecuritisa-
tion. It strengthened the capital treatment of securitisation and made changes
concerning the trading book rules. It supplied the rules with an incremental
risk capital charge and a stressed value-at-risk requirement. Also supervisory
review process was supplemented with respect to banks’ risk management and
capital planning processes.
2.4.3 Basel III
Basel III was introduced in 2010 by Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS 2010b). It is built on the experiences from the recent financial crisis
and tries to strengthen the regulatory requirements making them simpler at
the same time. The changes are made mainly in the area of increasing qual-
ity and quantity of regulatory capital. To address systemic risk within the
global financial system, Basel III introduces a set of tools and standards at
macroprudential level, such as countercyclical buffer and universal leverage ra-
tio. Question rises, if these measures would not slow the economic recovery.
According to BCBS research, they are likely to have a relatively modest impact
on growth, particularly, GDP is projected to decrease by 0.22 percentage points
below its baseline level in the 35th quarter after the start of implementation
process, followed by a recovery of growth towards the baseline (BCBS 2010a).
Blundell-Wignall & Roulet (2012) criticize Basel regulation, particularly its
excessive complexity and ineffectiveness. In the paper the authors argue that
simple leverage ratio should be the primary regulatory tool for bank capital.
The econometric study reveals the determinants of distance-to-default (DTD),
measured as a number of standard deviations away from the default point. It
was tested on a panel sample of 94 banks, with a special focus on G-SIFI banks.
The authors argue that Tier 1 capital ratios do not show any particular influ-
ence concerning distance to default of analysed banks. More importantly, Tier
1 ratio came out as statistically insignificant, in contrast to strong significance
of the leverage ratio. Concerning the counterparty credit risk, the authors
claim that derivatives have a strong direct effect on the DTD. According to the
paper, gross market value of derivatives is a key driver of the DTD and high
levels are associated with greater vulnerability.
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Cecchetti (2012) comments on reduction of counterparty credit risk in the
Basel III framework. The new regulation environment should be based on a
market capitalist system, where everyone has a right to succeed but on the other
hand has an opportunity to fail. In that case firms would treat risk management
differently. Moreover, since firms do not take into account risks that they create
for others, regulation should be macroprudential so that a failure is affordable
for the system. If we imagine 8 institutions engaged in OTC activities in a
circle such as in Figure 2.9 that every one has a long position with a partner on
the right and same short position with a partner on the left. Everyone in the
circle is perfectly hedged, but if on of the counterparties fail, circle is broken
and the balance is ruined. Limited counterparty credit risk should stem from
centralized clearing. The central counterparties reduce interconnectedness and
therefore the possibility of a systemic collapse. The situation can become even
more challenging if the counterparties are also connected with one another, not
just with the neighbour on either side of the circle. This scenario is very much
likely to happen and it increases the possibility of a systemic collapse of even
bigger proportion.
Figure 2.9: Connections between counterparties
Source: Author
How does the CCP handle the default of the clearing member? Since the
counterparty credit risk is shifted to the CCP, the process of handling this risk is
vital for the financial system. The CCP clearing member may fail due to events
such as non-payment of margins or the opening of an insolvency procedure. In
this case, the CCP has to take the open positions of the defaulting member
into its own book and tries to hedge off and close out these positions. To
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achieve this, the CCP may need the assistance of remaining clearing members,
for instance by bidding the defaulted positions. To cover for potential losses,
the CCP can access the collateral contributions (variation and initial margin)
and the CCP’s default fund. If these funds are insufficient, the CCP will use
default fund contributions and its own resources if needed (CGFS 2011).
2.4.4 Capital Requirements and Counterparty Credit Risk
under Basel III
The capital requirements notion was introduced because every bank faces risks
while conducting business. The risks cannot be reduced to zero and every risk
that the bank undertakes brings up a potential loss. The bank is not allowed
to transfer the losses to its creditors and so it must be capable to cover those
losses with its own means (capital).
The different risks are quantified and the possible losses are estimated. The
magnitude of this losses becomes the capital requirement. Hence, the sum
of capital requirements expresses the amount of risk undertook by the bank.
Moreover, the sum of capital requirements has to be smaller or equal than the
overall bank capital. The capital requirements are defined as a ratio of capital
to risk weighted assets (Zeman 2012).
The regulation of Basel follows these sound principles and requires banks
to hold a certain amount of capital to ensure that there is enough means to
continue the operations in the period of stress. According to BCBS (2011a),




Basel III is looking for a way how to ensure sufficient level of high quality
capital, the level of which the preceding crisis revealed as unsatisfactory. The
crisis also revealed some inconsistency in definitions of capital across jurisdic-
tions. The definition focuses now on common equity, the highest component of
a bank’s capital. There are two components of capital: Tier 1 (going-concern
capital), Tier 2 (gone-concern capital). Before Basel III existed also Tier 3, cap-
ital determined to cover the requirements to market risk, which was abolished
(BCBS 2011a).
 Tier 1 is the highest quality capital and it is divided into core T1 (com-
mon equity T1) and hybrid T1. The core T1 has to be at least 4.5% of
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risk-weighted assets at all times. The T1 capital as a whole must be at
least 6% of risk-weighted assets at all times.
 Tier 2 is a supplementary capital that does not qualify as Tier 1. The
volume of T2 cannot be higher than the volume of Tier 1.
The total counterparty credit risk capital charge under Basel III has two
components. Default risk capital charge and CVA capital charge:
Total CCR Capital Charge = Default Risk Capital Charge
+ CVA Risk Capital Charge
The CVA capital charge is described in detail in the chapter ’Model’.
The default risk capital charge for CCR is based on the risk weights obtained
from external rating and multiplying with the outstanding Exposure at Default
(EAD). The weights are given in the table below:









Source: Author based on BCBS (2011a)
Concerning exposure at default, BIS specifies three ways to compute EAD
for derivatives (BCBS 2005).
 Internal model method (IMM) - a bank is allowed to use its own
estimates that are developed through internal models in an advanced
EAD approach.
 Current exposure method (CEM) - used by banks that do not qualify
for the use of internal models. To calculate EAD the following equation
is used:
EAD = (RC + add-on)− volatility adjusted collateral
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Where:
– RC = Current Replacement Costs
– Add-on = the estimated amount of potential future exposure
 Standardised Method (SM) - used by banks that do not qualify for
IMM but would like to adopt a more risk-sensitive method than the CEM.
SM is simpler to calculate and has a number of simplifying assumptions
compared to IMM but it captures certain key features of IMM.
2.4.5 Capital Buffers
Concerning the additional capital, there are two capital cushions that the banks
have to follow: The capital conservation buffer and the countercyclical buffer
(Zeman 2012), (BCBS 2011a).
Capital conservation buffer forces the banks to have higher volume of
capital than required minimum standard (4.5%, resp. 8%). This serves as
an additional capital cushion. It should be created in favourable phases of
the cycle so it could used in distress. This buffer has also a microeconomic
character because it also protects the bank agains individual troubles. The
required minimum standard should be increased by 2.5 percentage points (7%
core T1, resp. 10.5% RWA). This buffer ought to consist of the best quality
capital, i.e. core T1. If the capital requirements drop below the limit 7%, the
bank does not have to limit its functioning but it has a decreased capability of
distribution of profit. This affects distribution of dividends, reverse purchase of
shares and payment of voluntary bonusses to the employees. The rule applies
that the lower the created buffer, the bigger the restriction to profit distribution.
The following table clarifies the last point.
Table 2.3: Minimum capital conservation standards
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio Minimum Capital Conservation Ratios
(expressed as a percentage of earnings)
4.5% - 5.125% 100%
>5.125% - 5.75% 80%
>5.75% - 6.375% 60%
>6.375% - 7.0% 40%
> 7.0% - 0% 0%
Source: BCBS (2011a)
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Countercyclical buffer is based on a macroeconomic perspective. It pro-
tects the financial sector as a whole in case of a recession and will be created in
case of steep rise of loan provision in the national economy. According to the
regulator’s decision, it would be dissolved in the period of a decline. The bank
creates the countercyclical buffer only against the exposures in the respective
national economy. For international banks a weighted average for exposures
is applied. If a bank fails to create the buffer, it faces a restriction of profit
distribution like in the previous case. The size of the buffer is between 0 and
2.5 percentage points.
Figure 2.10 summarizes the capital requirements for banks in the presence
of capital buffers.
Figure 2.10: The overview of capital requirements
Source: Author based on BCBS (2011a)
2.4.6 Leverage Ratio
Another tool that Basel III introduces to prevent future recessions is the lever-
age ratio. The rationale for this measure is the fact that during the financial
crisis the capital requirements were sufficient, but the financial leverage was too
big. It had a negative impact on financial system and real economy, because
the banks were forced to fire-sell their assets. Hence there is a inclination to
restrict the financial leverage and to find a measure which would be simple,
transparent and independent. The result is the leverage ratio.
The leverage ratio is the ratio between capital and the size of exposure. The




There is a minimum size of the LR,
LR = 3%
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. The computation takes into account the three-month average for last quater.
In the nominator there is the capital Tier 1 with the same definition as for the
capital requirements. If the exposure is deductable from T1, it is deducted from
the overall exposure, hence it carries no leverage effect. In the denominator
there is a size of the exposure with the components of assets from balance sheet,
repo operations, derivatives and off-balance sheet items (BCBS 2011a).
Concerning the time period of the leverage ratio introduction, it is not being
enforced immediately, but there is a monitoring period from 1.1.2013 - 1.1.2017.
The ratio could be recalibrated in the monitoring period. From 1.1.2017 there
is a compulsory limit for leverage ratio.
2.4.7 Timeline
A recent article from Bank for International Settlements BCBS (2013) sets
the timeline and implementation of Basel III. According to this report, the
timeliness and compactness of the implementation is going to play the key
role in building a resilient financial system and restore public confidence in
regulatory ratios. The report covers the progress of banks in fulfilling the
capital requirements and reinforcing the capital basis. It also points out weak
spots and shortcomings that come to surface and require attention.
The time of implementation of Basel III’s capital standards was set on 1
January 2013 with the agreement of Basel Committee members. They also
agreed to implement the Basel III standards before its date into national laws
and regulations. So far, total of 14 members have issued final Basel III-based
capital regulations and out of that 11 members have now final Basel III capital
rules in force. 13 members missed the deadline and is pressured to issue final
versions of the regulations as soon as possible so that the internationally agreed
transition periods can be met. Particularly, those members that host global
systemically important banks (G-SIBs) are forced to complete the final Basel
III regulation issuance. Nevertheless, there are positive news. For the 12
months ending June, large internationally active banks raised capital ratios,
e.g. Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratios increased from 7.1% to 8.5% (BCBS
2013).
The basic components of Basel III capital framework were completed in
2011, since then the remaining components were substantially finalised, as can
be seen in Table 2.4. The global and domestic systemically important financial
institutions (G-SIBs and D-SIBs) framework was published in 2011 and 2012
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respectively with a planned implementation in 2016. The framework for Liq-
uidity Coverage Ratio was published in 2013 and is going to be implemented
from 1 January 2015. The work on the framework for leverage ratio and Net
Stable Funding Ratio is still in progress and under an active development.
Table 2.4: Status of Basel III components and target dates for imple-
mentation
Core component of Basel III Progress
Basel III capital adequacy reforms Published in 2011; implementation from 1 January 2013
G-SIB/D-SIB framework Published in 2011/2012; implementation 1 January 2016
Liquidity Coverage Ratio Published in 2013; implementation from 1 January 2015
Leverage ratio Disclosure starting in 2015 with a view
to migrate to Pillar 1 in 2018.
Net Stable Funding Ratio Under review; minimum standard to be introduced in 2018
Source: BCBS (2013)
2.5 Stress Testing
Stress tests are used to assess the vulnerabilities of financial systems to credit
risk. They provide information on potential losses under exceptional but plau-
sible shocks. The policymakers have therefore useful information to detect the
predisposition of the financial systems to instability and crises. Stress tests can
be focused on an individual institution or a whole sector. The system stress
tests good complement those for an individual, because of a forward-looking
macroeconomic perspective and a focus on the financial system as a whole
(Foglia 2009).
Borio et al. (2012) discuss the usefulness of macro stress testing. They
claim, that given current technology, macro stress tests are not suitable as
early warning devices and cannot serve as a remedy trigger in a seemingly
calm period before crisis. Quite opposite, the stress tests were not part of the
solution, but part of the problem. They gave the policy makers false sense of
security, claiming that the system is sound. Two limitations have to be taken
into account. First, the model used to simulate the stress tests fails to provide
a realistic picture of the dynamics of financial distress. Second, considering the
context in which the stress tests are run, there is a paradox. The system looks
strongest precisely when it is most vulnerable. Hence, unless the limitations
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are fully understood, the stress test may be a false security indicator in the
future.
On the other hand, stress test can be used in the crisis as management
and resolution tools. In the crisis, when the sources of vulnerability can be
clearly observed, the technical limitations of stress test looses the impact. The
relevant scenarios are easier to identify. In early stages of the crisis can be
identified how much capital should be injected to the financial sector in order
to prevent a credit crunch. After all, the objective should be keeping financial
sector healthy so it does not constrain or misallocate the supply of credit and
ensure long run sustainable profitability.
A typical macro stress test for banks can be seen in Figure 2.11. It starts
with a sets of exogenous shocks, that are severe, but plausible. These simu-
lations creates scenarios. Then a model maps scenarios into outcomes. There
are two ways how to describe the process: top-down and bottom-up.
 Bottom-up - In a bottom-up case a central authority provides individ-
ual institutions with a common scenario, the institution themselves are
responsible for estimation of the impact of the shocks and the authority
afterwards sums up the results.
 Top-down - In this case the individual institutions are not directly in-
volved, the central authority uses its own internal model(s) to come up
with the results.
Figure 2.11: Schematic overview of the structure of macro stress tests
Source: Borio et al. (2012)
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The solid lines in Figure 2.11 represent the components captured by the
majority of stress tests, whereas the dotted lines show the feedback effects
described only by more sophisticated stress test models.
According to Burrows et al. (2012), the most comprehensive approach to
macro stress testing is the Risk Assessment Model of Systemic Institutions
(RAMSI). It was developed at the Bank of England and it is an example of a
top-down model. Its aim is to assess the solvency and liquidity risks faced by
banks. It focusses both on individual institutions and on the financial sector
as a whole. RAMSI model is structured by equations for each component of
each bank’s income. The equations use data from each bank’s income state-
ment and from the composition of each bank’s balance sheet. It is still under
development to better capture second-round effects, which are characteristic
features of systemic crises.
BCBS (2011a) specifies the enhanced criteria for banks that have to be
followed in Basel III:
 Banks have to ensure complete trade capture and exposure aggregation
across all forms of counterparty credit risk in a sufficient time period.
 Banks should produce exposure stress testing of principal market risk
factors on monthly basis.
 On quarterly basis banks should apply multifactor stress testing scenarios
and assess material non-directional risks. Also, stress testing applying
stressed conditions to the joint movement of exposures and counterparty
creditworthiness is required.
 Stress tests results should be integrated into reports for senior manage-
ment.
 The stress factors should be severe enough to capture historical extreme





The cornerstone of literature used for this chapter are the articles from Basel
Committee for Banking Supervision. BCBS (2011a) sets the Basel III require-
ments that the banks have to follow in 2013. Apart from raising the quality and
level of capital base, it ensures to capture all material risks, including coun-
terparty credit risk. According to (BCBS 2011a, pg. 29): ”Failure to capture
major on- and off-balance sheet risks, as well as derivative related exposures,
was a key factor that amplified the crisis.” The computation of statistical mea-
sures of exposure are based on BCBS (2005). The CVA computation are based
on Zhu & Pykhtin (2007) and Alluve (2012). Insights for the model are also
taken from Carlsson & Silén (2012) and Blundell-Wignall & Roulet (2012).
3.2 Model Specification
The following sections are explaining the model which will be used for cal-
culating CVA and testing the hypotheses stated below. As it was mentioned
before, the exposure of OTC derivatives are based on future development of
the swap value. Hence, the model input will be generated by Monte Carlo sim-
ulation.There are naturally some limitations to the model. It is focused only
on calculating CVA plain vanilla swaps. Major adjustment would be needed to
enable the model to be able to calculate other types of derivatives. Moreover,
neither netting nor collateral is allowed. It cannot handle the whole portfolio
together but only one counterparty and one contract at the time.
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3.2.1 Outline
In order to compute the credit valuation adjustment we need to estimate the
swap exposure. This is done by Monte Carlo simulation, where an estimation of
interest rate of the swap has to be made. After we arrive to the exposure levels,
the outcomes will be depicted in different scenarios, the result of the Monte
Carlo approach. After the different path of exposures are modelled we can
proceed to find out statistical measures of exposure, namely expected exposure
(EE). This measure is the input in the CVA computation. In the model we
focus on two other inputs: probability of default and loss given default. Then
we insert the inputs in the formula for computing the CVA (based on BCBS
(2011a) and finally we check the validity of hypotheses.
3.2.2 Hypotheses
The aim of the model is to asses the impact of the interest rate increase on
capital requirements of banks. The hypotheses are as follows:
 The increase of interest rate will have virtually no effect the capital re-
quirements of Czech banks.
 The increase of interest rate will have substantial effect on banks with
high exposure to derivatives (Bank of America, Citibank, JP Morgan).
 There is a direct correlation between CVA and interest rate.
3.3 Counterparty Credit Risk - Pricing
Counterparty credit risk is the risk that the counterparty of a derivative con-
tract will default before the contract expires and will not make the agreed
contract payments. Since exchange-traded derivatives have guaranteed cash
flows, only privately negotiated contracts such as OTC derivatives are subject
to the counterparty credit risk. Counterparty credit risk is similar to other
forms of credit risk with two exceptions: the uncertainty of exposure and bilat-
eral nature of credit risk (Zhu & Pykhtin 2007). In a typical lender-borrower
contract, everyone knows who is the lender and who is the borrower. More-
over the exact exposure is known, which is the borrowed amount. Since the
exposure of a derivative contract changes over time, it can easily happen that
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the roles reverse. In the following sections we will discuss how credit valuation
adjustment (CVA) is computed as the price of counterparty credit risk.
3.4 Exposure
Since the credit exposure of a derivative contract is unknown in the future,
a modelled framework is necessary to be utilized. The exposure depends on
internal factors of the trade (e.g. the amount of collateral) as well as external
factors (e.g. the interest rate). The exposure of the bank is zero if the contract
value is negative, because the bank has nothing to loose. If, on the other other
hand, the contract value is positive, the bank faces a positive exposure. If this
is the case in the time of the counterparty default, the three steps the bank
undertakes. The bank (i) closes out the position, but receives nothing from the
defaulting counterparty, then (ii) enters into a similar contract with another
counterparty and pays the market value of the contract and (iii) has a net loss
that equals the contract’s market value (Zhu & Pykhtin 2007).
Let us now put the counterparty exposure in more exact terms. If there is
only a single derivative contract in the bank’s portfolio, then the credit exposure
is equal to the maximum of the contract’s market value and zero. If the value
of contract i at time t is denoted as Vi(t), the contract-level exposure is given
by:
Ei(t) = max {Vi(t), 0} (3.1)
If there is more than one trade with a defaulted counterparty and the coun-
terparty credit risk is not in any way reduced, then according to Zhu & Pykhtin
(2007), the sum of all contract-level credit exposures is equal to the maximum







max {Vi(t), 0} (3.2)
To reduce the credit exposure significantly, the counterparties often use net-
ting agreements. In such contracts transactions with negative value can offset
the ones with positive value, thus the credit exposure at default is represented
only by the net positive value and the total credit exposure is reduced to the
maximum of the net portfolio value and zero:







However, there can be more netting agreements with one counterparty. Also
not every trade is covered by a netting agreement. Denoting the k th netting













max [Vi(t), 0] (3.4)
The inner sum of the first term represents the k the netting agreement,
the outer one sums exposures over all netting agreements. The second term
represents the trades that are not covered by any netting agreement (Zhu &
Pykhtin 2007).
3.4.1 Statistical Measures of Exposure
The statistical measures defined in this section are based on BCBS (2005)
and Carlsson & Silén (2012). We shall focus on three perhaps most widely
used measures of exposure: Expected exposure, potential future exposure and
expected positive exposure.
Expected Exposure is the probability-weighted average exposure. It repre-
sents the expected loss if the counterparty defaults. EE is the average of the
positive MtM-values, hence it is always larger than the average of the MtM-








 i=1,...,N is the number of the scenario
 Vti is the swap value for ith scenario in time t
Potential future exposure measures the worst possible exposure. It is the
maximum exposure estimated to occur on a future date at a high level of
statistical confidence (BCBS 2005). The confidence level could be e.g. 99%.
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This means, that with a 99% probability the exposure will not exceed the
PFE level. This measure reminds of value at risk (VaR). One of the difference
between PFE and VaR is, that for PFE the time horizon is generally longer.
In Figure 3.1 we can see the difference between expected exposure and
potential future exposure. PFE is always greater than EE, because it takes
only the greatest 95 of 99 percent, whereas EE takes the average of swap
exposures.
Figure 3.1: Statistical measures of exposure - EE, PFE
Source: Author
Expected positive exposure is the time-weighted average of individual ex-
pected exposures in given time horizon. Technically we take the values of EEt







Expected positive exposure can be seen in Figure 3.2. It is the average
throughout the life of the swap.
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Figure 3.2: Statistical measures of exposure - EPE, EE
Source: Author
3.5 Scenario Analysis
Scenario analysis is the process of creating set of realizations of counterparty-
level exposure, where each realization corresponds to one market scenario at
each simulation date. The scheme of the process can be seen in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Scheme of simulations for credit exposure
Source: Author
We can observe the different exposure for each simulation date. We start
with PV = 100 and see how it evolves over time. In the end we can see the
distribution of outcomes. It is not exactly right because we use only six different
scenarios. Normally we use the Monte Carlo approach to generate thousands
of scenarios, then the distribution would be as presented.
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The periods between the simulation dates are called ’time buckets’. The
number of simulation dates are usually restricted because of the computational
intensity required to calculate counterparty exposures. This holds mostly for
banks, while they have a large portfolio of derivatives. Therefore simulation
dates used by most banks usually comprise daily or weekly intervals up to a
month, monthly up to a year and yearly up to five years, etc. (Zhu & Pykhtin
2007).
3.6 Credit Valuation Adjustment
Credit valuation adjustment (CVA) is by definition the difference between the
risk-free portfolio value and the true portfolio value that takes into account
the possibility of the counterparty’s default (Zhu & Pykhtin 2007). Put it
differently, the CVA is the market value of counterparty credit risk. First we
clarify two important concepts: Probability of default and loss given default.
3.6.1 Probability of Default
In building a credit risk model one of the core inputs is probability of default
(PD). The accuracy of PD measurement has a great impact on the quality
of the results of credit risk model. PD is the probability that an institution
defaults during a specified period of time. It is based on macroeconomic as
well as microeconomic factors. Generally in a crisis, when the potential of
liquidity provision is low, PD gets higher across all institutions. However, it is
the question of each specific counterparty to deal with the economic downturn.
There are, however, obstacles to accurately compute PD estimations. One
of them is low number of defaults especially in high rating grades. Due to
relatively low number of borrowers a high degree of volatility is observed even
if some defaults take place in a given year. The usual banking practice for
obtaining PD values consist of qualitative mapping mechanism to bank-wide
master scales or external ratings (Engelmann & Ranhmeier 2011).
The approach that will be used in this model is based on BCBS (2011a).
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Where
 (PD(ti)− PD(ti−1) is the probability that the counterparty defaults be-
tween ti−1 and ti
 st is the credits spread of the counterparty at time ti, used to calculate
the CVA of the counterparty
 LGD is the loss given default of the counterparty, defined in the following
section
Generally under Basel III the banks that have internal models for credit
risk have to use this formula as a component of the overall CVA valuation. If
some variables are not available, for example credit spread of the counterparty,
then a proxy has to be used. In the case of credit spread there is a substitution
in the form of a proxy spread based on the rating, industry and region of the
counterparty (BCBS 2011a).
3.6.2 Loss Given Default
Loss given default (LGD) is the credit loss incurred if a debtor of the financial
institution defaults. More precisely it is the ratio of losses to exposure at
default. Three kinds of losses can occur: (i) the loss of principal, (ii) the
carrying costs of non-performing loans, and (iii) workout expenses. Three ways
can be used to measure LGD for an instrument. Market LGD is observed from
the market prices of defaulted bonds or marketable loans soon after the default
actually happens. Workout LGD is based on set of estimated discounted cash
flows resulting from workout (loan repayment) and estimated exposure. Finally,
implied market LGD is derived from risky but not defaulted prices of bonds,
where a theoretical asset pricing model is used (Schuermann 2004).
Where the lack of statistical data on defaults prevents from utilizing the
objective approaches of estimation, it is advised to use subjective approaches
based on expert judgement as a source of information. Interviews with ex-
perts, using comparables (e.g. similar portfolios) or scenario techniques should
be incorporated into evaluation. Basically all kinds of available loss related in-
formation should be an input to achieve the most accurate results (Engelmann
& Ranhmeier 2011).
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According to BCBS (2011a), LGD should be based on the spread of a market
instrument of the counterparty, or if not possible use a proxy spread based on
the rating, industry and region of the counterparty.
3.6.3 CVA
According to Vodička (2012), the basic definition of CVA can be written as:
CV A = PD ∗ LGD ∗ EAD (3.8)
In the Equation 3.8 the PD represents the probability of the counterparty’s
default. LGD is the loss given default, hence the percentage of what is lost if
the counterparty defaults. EAD is exposure at default.
BCBS (2011a) specifies 2 ways how to compute CVA capital requirement: Ad-
vanced CVA approach and Specified CVA Approach.
Standardized approach is defined for the banks that do not qualify for the
























 2.33 is the standard deviation for the 99% confidence interval
 h is the one-year risk horizon, h = 1
 EADtotali is the exposure at default of counterparty across all netting sets
 Bi is the notional amount of purchased single name CDS hedge, which is
used to hedge CVA risk
 Mi is the notional weighted average maturity
 wi is the weight allocated to the counterparty according to external rating
 Bind is the notional value of purchased index CDS
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 M ind is the maturity of the index hedged ’ind’
 wind is the weight applicable to index hedges
Advanced approach is applicable to the banks with EPE model and VaR
model for specific credit risk and will be used in the model. BCBS (2011a)
defines this CVA capital charge as follows:
CV A = LGD
∫ T
0
P (t)EE(t)dPD(0, t) (3.10)
P(t) is the risk-free discount factor for t, EE(t) is the risk-neutral expecta-
tion of the exposure to the counterparty at time t.
The integral can be approximated by a following sum (Alluve 2012).









Here, (PD(ti) − PD(ti−1) is defined in the chapter devoted to probability
of default.
3.7 Interest Rate Simulation
To simulate the interest rate movements a Monte Carlo model in excel was
used. The model comprised 1000 simulations, each simulation started at the
2% interest rate and increased randomly in the predefined fashion by changing
the range of random numbers. We cosider six different scenarios, from the
mildest increase to the most severe increase of the interest rate.
The cases are summarized in the Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Simulation of the interest rates
95% confidence interval of IR in Year 10
Scenario 1 2.05% - 2.10%
Scenario 2 2.5% - 3.0%
Scenario 3 3.0% - 4.0%
Scenario 4 3.4% - 5.0%
Scenario 5 4.4% - 7.0%
Scenario 6 6.0% - 10.0%
Source: Author
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Figure 3.4: Swap rate simulation; 1st case
Source: Author
Figure 3.5: Swap rate simulation; 2nd case
Source: Author
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Figure 3.6: Swap rate simulation; 3rd case
Source: Author
Figure 3.7: Swap rate simulation; 4th case
Source: Author
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Figure 3.8: Swap rate simulation; 5th case
Source: Author
Figure 3.9: Swap rate simulation; 6th case
Source: Author
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3.8 Swap Exposure Computation
We suppose a swap contract between two banks. We will call them Bank A
and Bank B. Bank A is paying a fixed rate of 2%, Bank B is paying a floating
rate based on the market conditions. We assume the notional value of the
swap being USD 100 million. To compute the exposure of the swap we use
the simulated interest rates of the previous six cases. For simplification, we
can look at the swap as it were 2 bonds. Since Bank A is paying the fixed
interest rate of 2%, then according to the assumption of rising interest rates
in all cases it will be always in the money. Hence Bank A will always have a
positive exposure and therefore faces the counterparty credit risk.
If we compute the market value of the swap in all the years of the swap’s
existence, we will automatically know the exposure of Bank A. Moreover we
assume the maturity of the swap 10 Years, USD 2 million coupon paid annually.
The following Figures show 10 (out of 1000) simulated exposures for the 6
scenarios.
Figure 3.10: Swap exposure simulation; 1st case
Source: Author
The exposure profile has a ’hill shape’, it starts at zero and ends at zero.
This is logical, because there is no uncertainty in the initiation and expiration
of the swap. Somewhere in the middle of the swap life the exposure is the
greatest, because of the highest uncertainty. As the projected interest rates are
rising, the exposures rises with them. The highest exposure in Figure 3.10 is
3. The Model 47
Figure 3.11: Swap exposure simulation; 2nd case
Source: Author
Figure 3.12: Swap exposure simulation; 3rd case
Source: Author
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Figure 3.13: Swap exposure simulation; 4th case
Source: Author
Figure 3.14: Swap exposure simulation; 5th case
Source: Author
3. The Model 49
Figure 3.15: Swap exposure simulation; 6th case
Source: Author
just USD 0.25 million, whereas in Figure 3.15 is about USD 16 million. Hence
rising interest rate have a great impact on the exposure profiles.
In Table 3.2 we can see the expected exposure of our swap in different sce-
narios. For reminder, expected exposure is computed as the average exposure
in given years, in our case from the 1000 simulations.
Table 3.2: Expected exposure of the swap
Maturity 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Scenario 1 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.00
Scenario 2 0.00 0.62 1.09 1.45 1.65 1.73 1.67 1.48 1.14 0.65 0.00
Scenario 3 0.00 1.19 2.12 2.77 3.22 3.37 3.24 2.87 2.23 1.27 0.00
Scenario 4 0.00 1.77 3.17 4.18 4.78 5.04 4.92 4.35 3.36 1.92 0.00
Scenario 5 0.00 2.92 5.19 6.80 7.84 8.18 7.98 7.08 5.51 3.17 0.00
Scenario 6 0.00 4.70 8.20 10.76 12.22 12.74 12.35 10.99 8.56 4.94 0.00
Source: Author
3.9 CVA Modelling
First, to see the big picture, let us explain the relationship between capital re-
quirements and the CVA. This relationship is depicted in Figure 3.16. The cap-
ital requirements is computed as the total capital of a bank over risk weighted
assets for three kinds of risk - market risk, operational risk and counterparty
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credit risk. Counterparty credit risk has two components - default risk capital
charge, which is the credit risk for conventional loans and CVA risk capital
charge for OTC transactions with unstable credit exposure.
Figure 3.16: How is capital requirements connected to CVA
Source: Author based on Carlsson & Silén (2012)
The expected exposures for the six scenarios computed in the previous sec-
tion forms the basic increment in the CVA formula. However, additional inputs
are needed to compute the CVA according to Equation 3.11 and Equation 3.7.
They are summarized in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Parameters to the CVA model
Parameter Value
Risk-free discount factor (Pt) 2%
Loss given default (LGD) 60%
CDS spread 0.1
Source: Author
The risk-free discount factor was set to 2%, Loss given default to 60% and
CDS spread to 0.1.
We can see in Table 3.4 that with increasing interest rates the CVA is
increasing more or less proportionally. In the mildest increase in scenario 1
the CVA is negligible. It sums up to 0.001% of the notional which makes
approximately USD 1,000. In the most severe scenario 6, however, the CVA
value is 0.078% of the notional USD 100 million, which makes USD 78,000.
Supposing a bank has in its portfolio more of these swaps and the total CVA is
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Table 3.4: CVA results in percentages
IR CVA
Scenario 1 2.05% - 2.10% 0.001%
Scenario 2 2.5% - 3.0% 0.011%
Scenario 3 3.0% - 4.0% 0.020%
Scenario 4 3.4% - 5.0% 0.031%
Scenario 5 4.4% - 7.0% 0.051%
Scenario 6 6.0% - 10.0% 0.078%
Source: Author
computed as a sum of each swap, then the overall CVA value is not something
that should be overlooked.
Let us more closely analyse the relationship between CVA and interest rate.
Since the simulated interest rate is in a range, the average of the two boarder
values was made. The outcome can be seen in the Figure 3.17. With the
increase of interest rate the CVA increases not linearly, but more rapidly. To
further specify the rate of increase a more profound analysis would be needed.
But we can reject the hypothesis the there is a linear relationship between CVA
and interest rate.
Figure 3.17: The development of CVA with increase of interest rate
Source: Author
To make the example more to the point, we can asses how the CVA would
impact the three Czech biggest banks: Komerčńı banka (KB), Česká spořitelna
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(CS) and Českoslovenkská obchodńı banka (CSOB). The input values are dis-
played in the Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: CVA inputs for KB, CS and CSOB
CAD % Capital (bn) RWA (bn) Derivatives (bn)
KB 14.6% 81.85 560.62 795.09
CS 13.1% 75.56 576.80 721.05
CSOB 13.6% 60.30 443.08 663.20
Source: Author based on Annual reports (2012)
If we apply the CVA percentages of our model case to the volume of each
banks derivatives, we get the results that are displayed in Table 3.6.
We can see that even in the most severe scenario 6 the CVA forms only
around 0.6 percent of the banks’ capital. We can conclude that in the Czech
Republic the banks have a solid capital base in proportion to derivatives hence
Basel III CVA capital charge will have a small impact on the capital require-
ments. Thus the policy recommendation should follow that the use of CCPs
should be limited in the Czech Republic. Nevertheless there are banks that use
derivatives more abundantly and the analysis should reveal potential threat
to them. We will focus on three of those banks that have the highest deriva-
tive exposure: JP Morgan Chase (JPM), Citibank and Bank of America. The
exposure of the preceding banks can be seen in Figure 3.18.
Figure 3.18: Exposure to derivatives of JPM, Citibank and Bank of
America
Source: Author based on Call Reports RC-L (2012)
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Table 3.6: CVA for each scenario for Czech banks
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As can be seen, the highest exposure has the investment bank JPM, almost
USD 70 trillion in 2012. There has been a massive reduction since 2008, where
the exposure exceeded USD 87 trillion. Nevertheless the exposure remains still
the highest among all US banks. The second place takes for the last three
years (2010-2012) Citibank, currently with the exposure over USD 55 trillion
and the third bank is Bank of America with exposure exceeding 42 trillion.
Bank of America also greatly reduced the exposure since the year 2011 by USD
7.7 trillion.
Comparing Czech banks’ exposure to derivatives, as can be seen the Ta-
ble 3.5, with their American counterparts, we can conclude that on average
the exposure of JPM, Citibank and Bank of America is more than 1,670 times
higher than the average exposure of Česká Spořitelna, Komerčńı banka and
CSOB. This is of course an impressive number, but we have to take into ac-
count the size of the bank, mainly its capital base. If the proportion of exposure
to derivatives and capital would be the same as in case of Czech banks, then
the exposure in the absolute numbers would be of a small importance.
The comparison of the Czech and American banks concerning the ratio of
exposure to capital can be seen in Figure 3.19. The numbers are for the year
2012.
Figure 3.19: Exposure to Capital ratio
Source: Author
The difference is very clear. The Czech banks have their exposure to deriva-
tives on average 8 times higher than their overall capital. Bank of America,
Citibank and JPM have their ratios 179, 293 and 338 respectively. Hence the
demand for capital would be a lot more than in Czech banks in case of the
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increase of interest rate. The summary Table 3.7 is an analogy of Table 3.6,
but instead of Czech banks we analyse Bank of America, Citibank and JP Mor-
gan. In the mild Scenario 1 the banks are not facing any troubles. The CVA
represents only a fraction of percentages of the for-mentioned banks’ capital.
However, in Scenario 2 the percentage rises significantly, for JPM it is 3.6%,
for Citibank it is 3.1% and 1.9% for Bank of America. The percentages grows
as the interest rate grow and in the most severe Scenario 6, the CVA in per-
centages of capital increases to the threatening 26.5% for JP Morgan, 22.9%
for Citibank and 14.0% for Bank of America. If the interest rate increased to
fulfill this scenario, the banks would face severe deleveraging and the problems
of great proportions.
The results are supported by Blundell-Wignall & Roulet (2012). The au-
thors found a significant relationship between derivative exposure and distance
to default. Specifically, among three analysed US banks, the worst came out
Bank of America with distance to default (DTD) of 1.67 standard deviations.
Citibank had the DTD 1.86 and surprisingly, as the most safe bank came out
JP Morgan with DTD 2.55. The authors commented on this outcome, stating
that JPM received a guarantee for $29bn of the $30bn less-liquid mortgage
backed securities issued by Bear Stearns that was taken over be JPM. In this
respect, some negative DTD attributes were ameliorated.
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Table 3.7: CVA for each scenario for JP Morgan, Citibank and Bank
of America
Scenario 1 CVA (in bn USD) CVA in % of capital
JP Morgan 0.7 0.4%
Citibank 0.6 0.3%
Bank of America 0.5 0.2%
Scenario 2
JP Morgan 7.4 3.6%
Citibank 5.9 3.1%
Bank of America 4.5 1.9%
Scenario 3
JP Morgan 14.1 6.9%
Citibank 11.3 6.0%
Bank of America 8.7 3.7%
Scenario 4
JP Morgan 21.3 10.5%
Citibank 17.1 9.1%
Bank of America 13.1 5.5%
Scenario 5
JP Morgan 35.1 17.2%
Citibank 28.2 14.9%
Bank of America 21.6 9.1%
Scenario 6
JP Morgan 54.0 26.5%
Citibank 43.3 22.9%
Bank of America 33.2 14.0%
Source: Author
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3.10 Sensitivity Analysis
In this sections we will examine the sensitivity of parameters LGD, CDS spread
and Pt. To perform the sensitivity analysis we chose 10 different values of
respected variables and run the model with each of them. The results tell us
how sensitive the CVA is to our selected variables. All the variables are held
constant during the life of the swap. The results below are computed for the
most severe 6th scenario.
In Table 3.8 we can see the development of the variable P(t), i.e. the risk-
free discount factor. To make the result more visible, it is also displayed in
Figure 3.20. The values are linearly increasing from 0.5% to 5%. The value
of CVA rises as the P(t) rises which is logical. The risk-free discount factor
determinates how much of the exposure forms the CVA. The higher P(t), the
higher CVA.
Table 3.8: Sensitivity of P(t)
P(t) 0.50% 1.0% 1.5% 2.0% 2.5% 3.0% 3.5% 4.0% 4.5% 5.0%
CVA 0.020% 0.039% 0.059% 0.078% 0.097% 0.118% 0.137% 0.156% 0.177% 0.194%
Source: Author
Figure 3.20: Sensitivity of P(t)
Source: Author
The values for the CDS spread were chosen from 0.01 to 2 (or 100 to 2000
bps). CVA rises up to the value 0.2, where it breaks even and is declining
thereafter. The process can be seen in Table 3.9 and Figure 3.21. This is an
3. The Model 58
unusual development, it would be more sensible to expect the rising CVA as
the CDS rises without any cap. This abnormality would suggest to extend our
research to find out the reasons for the CVA decline.
Table 3.9: Sensitivity of CDS spread
CDS 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.7 1 1.5 2
CVA 0.016% 0.029% 0.056% 0.079% 0.084% 0.057% 0.047% 0.039% 0.033% 0.029%
Source: Author
Figure 3.21: Sensitivity of CDS
Source: Author
The final variable is LGD, i.e. loss given default. It covers percentages from
10% to 100%. Logicaly, the CVA is rising with the rise of LGD, as can be seen
in Table 3.10 and Figure 3.22. CVA is expressing the value of counterparty
credit risk, which is dependent on the variable of how much cannot be saved
after the default of the counterparty. That is why the CVA rises when the LGD
is increaring, hence increasing the cost of default.
Table 3.10: Sensitivity of LGD
LGD 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
CVA 0.009% 0.025% 0.042% 0.057% 0.068% 0.079% 0.087% 0.094% 0.100% 0.106%
Source: Author
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In the thesis we presented a model for assessing what would be the impact
of counterparty credit risk on capital requirements of banks, if interest rate
suddenly increased. Our first hypothesis regarded the Czech banking sector.
We came to conclusion that Czech banks have enough capital concerning po-
tential interest rate increase to withstand any analysed scenario. The second
hypothesis related to the US banks. We concluded that Bank of America,
Citibank and JP Morgan do not have the capital base that would protect them
form the increase of the IR. This founding was supported by the OECD re-
search, Blundell-Wignall & Roulet (2012). In this OECD research paper the
authors confirmed the significantly positive relationship between distance-to-
default (DTD) and exposure to derivatives. Bank of America and Citibank
belonged to the more threatened with Distance-to-Default less than 2 (1.86
and 1.67 respectively). JP-Morgan’s relative high DTD (2.55) was ameliorated
due to guarantee stemming from takeover of Bear Stearns. The third hypoth-
esis referred to the relationship between interest rate and CVA, where we did
not find a direct correlation.
The focus was also aimed at central counterparties, whether the centralized
clearing would help to mitigate counterparty credit risk. The CCPs are inher-
ently too big too fail and systemically important institutions. They handle a
tremendous amount of counterparty credit risk. There is a very strong fear that
the contagion would spread further if a central counterparty defaults. Hence
the moral hazard of the management should be anticipated and reduced by
careful regulations.
The future research will be focused on improvement of the model and deep-
ening the knowledge about Basel III impact on banks’ capital requirements and
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overall financial stability. The rigorousness of the model will be upgraded so
that it will be able to capture more than just plain vanilla swaps and to com-
pute with netting and collateral agreements that are most common in an OTC
trade. Another issue is that the model produces outcomes for unilateral coun-
terparty credit risk. This means it neglects the fact that the institution may
default before its counterparty. In this case the default of the latter counter-
party would become irrelevant or even profitable; it would pay only a fraction
of the contract’s value.
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Appendix
Figure 4.1: Overview of progress in implementation of the Basel cap-
ital framework by Basel Committee member jurisdictions
Source: BCBS (2013)
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